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Kahan: Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortag

NOTE
INCENTIVIZING ORGAN DONATION: A
PROPOSAL TO END THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

As of October 6, 2008, over 100,000 people in the United States
were waiting for a potentially lifesaving organ transplant.' Tragically,
each day an average of eighteen people die waiting.2 A major portion of
the organ shortage stems from the fact that the United States prohibits
compensation for organ donations, eliminating all incentive short of
altruism to donate. The ban on financial compensation thus dramatically
reduces the number of potential organ donors and increases the chance
that a patient will die before an organ becomes available.
At the same time, in the United States, female eggs are sold on a
free market. As such, unlike in other countries where compensation for
egg donations is restricted,3 in America there is no shortage of eggs for
use in assisted reproduction. Many women altruistically donate their
eggs for little or no compensation, while at other times the price tag has
been as high as $100,000. 4 So, why is the sale of organs prohibited when
both society and the government sanction the sale of ova? The same
policy concerns that led the United States to ban the sale of organs exist
in the free market for eggs. Nevertheless, the market in eggs thrives
giving thousands of women the chance to carry a child to term each year
while, at the same time, nearly an equal number of people die waiting
for an organ transplant because eligible donors have no incentive to even
consider donation.
Many policies have been proposed and implemented in the United
States and abroad in an effort to increase the organ supply. However, no
1. U.S. Transplant Waiting List Passes 100,000, http://www.unos.org/news/newsDetail.
asp?id= 1165 (last visited June 12, 2010).
2. Donate Life America, Understanding Donation: Statistics, http://www.donatelife.net/
UnderstandingDonation/Statistics.php (last visited June 12, 2010).
3. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
4. Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L.
REv. 45, 49 (2007).
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country has yet offered financial incentives as a means to boost donation
rates.' In this Note I will argue for the legalization of financial incentives
for organ donations in order to increase the organ supply through both
living and cadaveric donations. While there are valid arguments against
the implementation of an incentive-based system of organ donation,
many of these concerns can be accommodated through regulation rather
than prohibition.
Part II of this Note details the law governing organ donations in the
United States and abroad; namely the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA" or "the Act") 6 and the National Organ Transplant Act
("NOTA"),7 both of which stand in the way of providing financial
incentives for organ donation in the United States. Part III discusses the
current scarcity of transplantable organs from both cadaveric and live
organ donors. Part IV rebuts common arguments in opposition to the
legalization of an incentive-based system of organ donation, such as the
paternalistic belief that compensation for organ donations would exploit
the poor, creating a disparity in organ donation and allocation among
different socioeconomic groups.
Part V discusses egg donation, more specifically, current legislation
regarding the sale of ovum, as well as why compensation for egg
donations is permitted in the United States. Part VI will analyze the
arguments in favor of allowing financial incentives for organ donations.
Lastly, in Part VII, I propose an incentive-based solution to the organ
shortage. Under my proposed model, a procurement agency, regulated
by the government, would be the sole entity permitted to purchase
organs from live or cadaveric donors and would allocate those organs to
transplant centers in the same manner that they are allocated today. This
system would provide financial incentives for donations, while avoiding
many of the concerns associated with a market for organs.
11.

THE PROBLEM: SCARCITY OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION

Each day only eighty people receive an organ for transplantation
while 150 people are added to the waitlist.8 This gap continues to widen

5. T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, On the Ethics of Paying Organ Donors: An
Economic Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 827, 828 (2006).
6.

REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 52 (Supp. 2009).

7. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (2006)).
8. The International Association for Organ Donation, Understanding: Statistics/Facts,
http://iaod.orglunderstanding-organ-donation.htm (last visited June 12, 2010).
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as the organ donation rate has remained constant since 2005.9 The
shortage is not due to an inadequate amount of transplantable organs, as
there is an estimate of 12,000 to 15,000 eligible cadaveric donors per
year.o A 100% recovery rate from 15,000 donors would result in a
procurement of over 50,000 organs, a momentous leap towards
eventually meeting our organ demand." Unfortunately, merely half of
all eligible donors consent-proof that the current altruistic method of
organ procurement is ineffective.12 Likewise, the shortage is not due to a
lack of support for organ donation. According to a 2005 Gallup poll,
95.4% of Americans reported that they "support" or "strongly support"
organ donation, yet only 53.2% granted permission on their driver's
license, carry a donor card or joined a registry.' 3
Consequences of the organ shortage are not limited to loss of life;
the government and American citizens bear substantial economic
burdens. Patients waiting for an organ transplant incur costly medical
bills for long-term disease management treatments. According to one
expert, "for every new transplanted kidney ... Medicare would avoid
direct dialysis costs of approximately $55,000 per year for each patient
transplanted .... "1 4 Thus, Medicare saves roughly $220,000 over four
years for every kidney donation.' 5
There has been a shortage of organs for transplantation for as long
as the technology for organ transplants has existed.' 6 The medical
9. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Donors Recovered in the U.S.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/SharedContentDocuments/Fall_2008_Regional Meeting DataSlide
s.pdf.
10. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., VARIATION IN
ORGAN DONATION AMONG TRANSPLANT CENTERS 1 (2003), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/
oeilreports/oei-01-02-00210.pdf. Due to the need for healthy, fully functioning organs there is a
natural ceiling on cadaveric donors. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
11. M. Lane Molen, Comment, Recognizing the Larger Sacrifice: Easing the Burden Borne
by Living Organ Donors Through FederalTax Deductions, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 459, 467 (2007).
12. Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: EncouragingBlood and Organ Donation
Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 68 (2008).
13. THE GALLUP ORG., 2005 NAT'L SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES
AND BEHAVIORS 5, 9 (2005), availableat ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf. The survey
shows that 40.5% of Americans "strongly support" organ donation, 54.9% "support" organ
donation, and only 4.6% "oppose" or "strongly oppose" organ donation for transplants. Id. at 5.
14. Ginny Bumgardner and Trent Tipple, Testimony before Subcommittee on Labor, Health
and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies 3 (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.as-t.org/files/pdf/publicjpolicy/pubpol-library/TransRoundtable41505.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Sean Arthurs, Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model
Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failureof Our National Organ DonationRegime, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1112 (2005); S. Gregory Boyd, Comment, Consideringa Market in Human
Organs, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 417, 420 (2003). Skin grafts became routine in the 1920s and cornea
transplants were perfected by the 1940s. Kelly Ann Keller, Comment, The Bed ofLife: A Discussion
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community has employed organ substitutes such as artificial organs17
and xenotransplantation in an attempt to circumvent the organ
shortage.18 These alternatives have seen some degree of success,
however human organ transplants from cadaveric or live donors remain
the most practical and successful method of treating advanced organ
failure.19
A. Shortage of CadavericDonors
Cadaveric donation, the donation of one's organs upon death, is the
most widely accepted source of organs for donation.20 Cadaveric
donations are preferred over live donations because they pose no health
risk to the donor and produce a greater quantity of organs and tissues.2 '
From a single cadaveric donor at least twenty-five different body parts
and fluids may be donated for procedures ranging from heart-lung
transplants to facial reconstruction.2 2
Nevertheless, there are constraints on the supply of cadaveric
donors which exacerbate the organ shortage. For organs to be viable for
of Organ Donation, Its Legal and Scientific History, and a Recommended "Opt-Out" Solution to
Organ Scarcity, 32 STETSON L. REv. 855, 865-66 & n.63 (2003). The first successful kidney
transplant took place in 1954. Id. Successful heart, lung, and pancreas transplantations followed
shortly after. Id.
17. Artificial organs can substitute for human organs for only a limited length of time. The
Left Ventricular Assist Device ("LVAD") is a heart-related artificial device which assists the left
ventricle in pumping oxygenated blood to the body. LVADs, like all other artificial organs, are not
meant to be a permanent replacement for a human organ. They are instead used to bide time while a
patient waits for a transplantable organ. Boyd, supra note 16, at 430.
18. Fritz H. Bach et al., Ethicaland Legal Issues in Technology: Xenotransplantation,27 AM.
J.L. & MED. 283, 284-85 (2001). Xenotransplantation is the transplantation of animal organs,
tissues, and cells into humans. Id. Proponents of xenotransplantation believe that with further
research of immunosuppressant drugs and genetic engineering of animals, one day
xenotransplantation can offer an unlimited supply of organs for transplantation. Id. Nevertheless,
graft rejection, cross-species disease transfer, and moral objections by some groups, such as animalrights activists, are all problems that must be remedied before xenotrasnplantation can become an
accepted alternative to human organ transplants. Boyd, supra note 16, at 428-29 & n.95.
19. Boyd, supra note 16, at 420.
20. Vanessa Chandis, Comment, Addressing a Dire Situation: A Multi-FacetedApproach to
the Kidney Shortage, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 205, 210 (2006).
21. Molen, supranote 11, at 466.
22. Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market
in Bodily Organs, 55 OIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1994). From a single cadaveric donor the following
organs and tissue may be donated: brain tissue, I jaw bone, bone marrow, 1 heart, 4 separate valves,
2 lungs, I liver, 2 kidneys, small and large intestines, 206 separate bones, 27 ligaments and
cartilage, 2 corneas to restore sight, 2 of each inner ear, 1 heart pericardium which is used to cover
the brain after surgery, I stomach, I pancreas, 2 hip joints, over 600,000 miles of blood vessels, and
approximately 20 square feet of skin. Christy M. Watkins, A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of
Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and PotentialReform Alternatives, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 5 (2005).
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donation, the donor must have died in a way that left their organs fully
functioning and free from disease.23 This limitation creates a natural
ceiling on the number of eligible cadaveric donors.24 Estimates show that
only 2% of potential donors meet the medical requirements.25
Consent is another constraint which impedes the use of all potential
cadaveric donors. 26 Although the UAGA regards donor cards or official
records of an individual's desire to make an anatomical gift as legally
sufficient to allow for the harvesting of a deceased's organs,27 most
states require consent from the next of kin first. 28 A 2001-2002 study by
the Department of Health and Human Services found a national average
consent rate of 51%.29 This is unexpectedly low considering
approximately 95% of Americans support the idea of cadaveric organ
donations.30 While the need for fully functioning organs will always
limit the donor pool, financial incentives have the capability to
drastically increase consent rates.
B. Shortage ofLive Donors
A living donation involves the donation of a nonvital organ while
alive. 3 1 A single kidney, liver, lung, intestine, pancreas, and even a heart
can all be donated from a live donor.32 Live donations from related
23. Molen, supra note 11, at 467.
24. Id.
25. Clamon, supra note 12, at 68.
26. See Molen, supra note 11, at 467-68.
27. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 14(a) (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 93 (Supp.
2009). The UAGA requires a reasonable search for records to determine whether the deceased
desired to donate, as well as a reasonable search for family members authorized to donate on their
behalf. Id. at § 14(a), (g).
28. Molen, supranote 11, at 468-69.
29. Id. at 467-68; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 3.
30. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31. See
United
Network
of
Organ
Sharing,
Transplant
Living,
http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/facts/organs.aspx (last visited June 11, 2010).
32. Id
*
[K]idney - This is the most frequent type of living organ donation. [For the
donor, there is little risk in living with one kidney because the remaining
kidney compensates to do the work of both kidneys.]
*
[L]iver - Individuals can donate a segment of the liver, which has the ability
to regenerate and regain full function.
*
[L]ung - Although lung lobes do not regenerate, individuals can donate a lobe
of one lung.
*
[I]ntestine - Although very rare, it is possible to donate a portion of your
intestine.
*
[P]ancreas - Individuals can also donate a portion of the pancreas. [Like the
lung, the pancreas does not regenerate, but donors usually have no problems
with reduced function.]
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donors are universally accepted provided that they are free from
coercion and meet informed consent requirements.3 3 Likewise, live
donations from unrelated donors, while more controversial, are not
prohibited by any laws in the United States.34
Society has shown a positive attitude towards live donations. A
2005 Gallup poll showed that 91% of Americans were "very likely" or
"somewhat likely" to provide a live donation to a family member,35 75%
were "very likely" or "somewhat likely" to donate to a close friend, and
38% were "very likely" or "somewhat likely" to donate to a stranger.36
Even if recovery rates of cadaveric donors were improved, due to natural
constraints on cadaveric donors,37 live donations would still be
necessary. Currently, donations "by altruistic strangers makes up less
than 1 percent of live kidney donations in the United States."3 9 Providing
compensation for live donations is a simple, yet effective, means of
enlarging the group of individuals willing to donate.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ORGAN DONATION

The organ donation system in the United States is based on
altruistic principles. The system is detailed in two acts, the UAGA 40 and

*

[H]eart - A domino transplant makes some heart-lung recipients living heart
donors. When a patient receives a heart-lung "bloc" from a deceased donor,
his or her healthy heart may be given to an individual waiting for a heart
transplant. Extremely rare, this procedure is used when physicians determine
that the deceased donor lungs will function best if they are used in
conjunction with the deceased donor heart.

Id.
33. Kelly Lobas, Note, Living Organ Donations: How Can Society Ethically Increase the
Supply of Organs? 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 475, 486-87 (2006).
34. Id. at 487. One reason for the controversy surrounding living donations is because doctors
take the Hippocratic Oath, swearing that they will act within the best interest of the patient. When a
doctor removes a healthy organ from a healthy individual the doctor is putting that individual's
health at risk, violating the "principle of non-malfeasance, 'above all, do no harm."' Keller, supra
note 16, at 870-71 (quoting R.W. Strong & S.V. Lynch, Ethical Issues in Living Related Donor
Liver Transplantation,reprinted in THE ETHics OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE

41,42 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998)).
35. THE GALLUP ORG., supra note 13, at 19-20. Only 4.4% of Americans reported that they
were "not at all likely" to donate while living to a family member. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 19-20.
37. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
38. Molen, supranote I1, at 473.
39. David Steinberg, Kidneys and the Kindness of Strangers, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July-Aug.
2003, at 184, 185.
40. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 52 (Supp. 2009).
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the NOTA. 4 1 These statutes set forth laws regarding the procurement and
allocation of organs for transplantation.
A. Unform Anatomical Gift Act
First Drafted in 1968, the UAGA was enacted the same year as the
first successful heart and liver transplants.42 The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted the Act
with the purpose of outlining uniform legal and ethical guidelines for
cadaveric organ procurement, allocation and transplantation in the hopes
of increasing the organ supply. 43 The Act, among other things, provided
that an individual can either pre-designate his organs to be donated upon
death, or, at death, the decedent's next of kin can consent to donation."
Although the Act did not explicitly forbid compensation for organ
donations, the Act did use the term "gift" which was interpreted to
45
prohibit the sale or purchase of organs.
Despite its adoption in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, 4 6 the 1968 UAGA failed to increase the organ supply. 47 In
fact, the demand for transplantable organs at this time increased due to
the development of Cyclosporine, an immunosuppressant that increases
compatibility between the donor organ and the recipient.4 8 Additionally,
49
the organs' imminent expiration further impeded their procurement.
Organs must be harvested shortly after death in order to be viable for
transplantation, but often by the time a will was located and read it was
41. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (2006)).
42. Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & PrivateOrdering,49 ARIZ. L. REV.
599, 618 (2007).
43. Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Note, Finding the Winning Combination: How Blending Organ
Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1677, 1683 (2006).

44. UNIF ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a)-(b) (1968), 8A U.L.A. 116 (2004).
45. Statz, supra note 43, at 1683-84. The UAGA does not address live donations. Goodwin,
supra note 42, at 620.
46. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 78 (2004); Jo-Anne Yau, Stealing What's Free: Exploring
Compensation to Body Parts Sources for Their Contribution to ProfitableBiomedical Research, 5
PIERCE L. REv. 91, 99 (2006).
47. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 113

(2006).
48. Id. at 112-13. Immunosuppressants are used to suppress the immune systems of organ
transplant recipients. When a person receives an organ transplant their white blood cells will try to
reject the transplanted organ. Inmmunosuppressants prevent the white blood cells from doing this.
See, e.g., MayoClinic.com, Cyclosporine, http://www.mayoclinic.com/healthldrug-information/
DR601591 (last visited June 12, 2010).
49. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 47, at 113.
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too late to begin the harvesting process.5 0 For the same reason, donor
cards were ineffective since often the deceased was not carrying his card
when brought to the hospital in an emergency. 5' Lastly, the Act did not
require hospitals or doctors to request donations from patients or the
family of the deceased, leaving many viable organs unused.52
In 1987, the NCCUSL amended the UAGA 5 3 placing added
emphasis on the need for organs for transplantation rather than research
or education. 4 The main goal of the amended Act was to increase the
organ supply by simplifying the donation process and encouraging
altruism.55 Now, an anatomical gift made by the deceased before death is
irrevocable.56 The Act gives the donor's requests priority over family
objections57 to insure that the intent of the donor is carried out and not
subsequently vetoed by his next of kin. For the same reason, if a donor
wishes to limit his anatomical gift to a particular organ or for a specific
purpose, e.g., transplantation rather than medical research, his request
must be clearly stated. 59 Additionally, hospitals are now required to
discuss the option of donation with terminally ill patients and the
families of the recently deceased.60 Despite this legal obligation, one
study found that 30% of families of potential donors were not
approached about consenting to organ donation.6 ' And, even when
62
approached, about half the time families decline to donate.

50. Id. at 113.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 115.
53. The UAGA of 1987 was only adopted by about half of the states and was amended once
again in 2006 to clarify ambiguities that arose since the 1987 amendments. Richard J. Bonnie et al.,
Legal Authority to Preserve Organs in Cases of UncontrolledCardiac Death: Preserving Family
Choice, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 742 (2008).
54. Statz, supra note 43, at 1684. For example, let say a donor executes a will leaving his
entire body to a medical school for research or education. If the donor later signs a document
donating a kidney for transplantation, the donor's kidney, if medically suitable, would go to a
procurement organization and the donor's body without the kidney would go to the specified
medical school. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6 cmt. (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 70
(Supp. 2009).
55. See Statz, supra note 43, at 1684.
56. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §2(h) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 25 (2004) ("An
anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the
consent or concurrence of any person after the donor's death.").
57. Id. §3(a), 33-34.
58. Id. §2 cmt., 26-27; Bonnie et al., supra note 53, at 743.
59. Id. §2 cmt., 25.
60. Id. §5, 44.
61. Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 82
(1994). One reason for this may be that it is difficult for healthcare professionals to have this
sensitive discussion while families are in intense grief. Statz, supra note 43, at 1685.
62. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/10

8

Kahan: Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortag

2009]1

INCENTIVIZING ORGAN DONATION

765

Most notably, the 1987 amendment explicitly prohibited the sale
and purchase of organS63 and imposed a penalty for violations which
includes a felony conviction, potential imprisonment for a maximum of
five years, and up to a $50,000 fine. 4
B. National Organ TransplantAct
NOTA was enacted to encourage live organ donation, clarify
acceptable organ procurement practices, and improve the efficiency of
the organ donation and allocation process.65 Legislative history suggests
that the primary concern that led to the enactment of NOTA was the fear
that a market in organs would result in commodification of the human
66
body and exploitation of the poor.
NOTA was promulgated primarily in response to a scheme by Dr.
H. Barry Jacobs to broker human kidneys.67 Jacobs established a
company, called The International Kidney Exchange, Ltd., to
"commission kidneys from persons living in Third World countries or in
disadvantaged circumstances in the United States for whatever price
would induce them to sell their organs." 68 He planned to resell the
organs he procured at an agreed-upon price plus an additional $2,000 to
$5,000 for his services. 6 9 To prevent similar "profit-motivated commerce
in living donor organs," Title three of NOTA explicitly prohibits the sale
or purchase of organs, 70 as the Act states, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation ....

63. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 ("A person may not knowingly, for
valuable consideration, purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is
intended to occur after the death of the decedent.").
64. Id. § 10(c), 62. This prohibition on valuable consideration does not apply to the "removal,
processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, transportation, or implantation" of the
organ. Id § 10(b).
65. Calandrillo, supranote 46, at 79.
66. H.R. REP. NO. 98-575, at 8, 22-23 (1983).
67. Calandrillo, supranote 46, at 79-80.
68. Alicia M. Markmann, Comment, Organ Donation:IncreasingDonations While Honoring
Our Longstanding Values, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 499, 505-06 (2005) (quoting
BETHANY SPEILMAN, ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 145
(1996)).
69. Patrick D. Carlson, Comment, The 2004 Organ DonationRecovery and Improvement Act:
How Congress Missedan Opportunity to Say "Yes" to FinancialIncentives for Organ Donation, 23
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 136, 158 (2006).
70. Id. at 159.
71. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §274e(a) (2009). This provision was
proposed by then-Senator Albert Gore. Carlson, supranote 69, at 158-59.
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The organ sale ban does not apply to all bodily products nor does it
prohibit all compensation.7 2 The Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources noted that the prohibition does not apply to body
products that "can be replenished and whose donation does not
compromise the health of the donor." 7 3 Likewise, the term "valuable
consideration," as in the UAGA, "does not include the reasonable
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ
or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor
of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ."7 4 Thus,
although the organs themselves are not for sale, all other products and
services associated with organ procurement, allocation and transplant
are.75 This exception allows all parties, except the source of the organ, to
receive compensation for their role in the transplant.76 Denial of source
compensation is a serious flaw in the current organ procurement system
which will be discussed in greater detail later in this Note.77
In order to encourage organ donation, NOTA created the National
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), a not-forprofit private organization charged with promoting organ donation,
establishing organ procurement protocols and ensuring that organs are
allocated appropriately. The United Network for Organ Sharing
("UNOS") was created by the OPTN to carry out these objectives.79
UNOS's mission is "to advance organ availability and transplantation by
uniting and supporting ... communities for the benefit of patients
through education, technology and policy development."8
To
accomplish its goals, UNOS maintains the transplant waitlist,
coordinates matches of donors and candidates,81 reports transplantation
data,82 increases public awareness, provides assistance to patients in

72. S. REP. No. 98-382, at 16-17 (1984) reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982.
73. Id.
74. § 274e(c)(2).
75. See Calandrillo,supra note 46, at 81; Yau, supranote 46, at 98.
76. See Yau, supranote 46, at 98.
77. See infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
78. See § 274; see also Calandrillo,supranote 46, at 81.
79. United Network for Organ Sharing, Who We Are, http://www.unos.org/whoweare/ (last
visited June 12, 2010).
80. Id.
81. UNOS maintains a twenty-four hour hotline to aid organ procurement organizations in the
matching process. United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do, Organ Sharing,
http://www.unos.org/whatWeDo/organCenter.asp (last visited June 12, 2010).
82. UNOS has collected, maintained, and analyzed data from nearly every organ transplant
since 1986.
United Network
for Organ Sharing,
What We
Do, Research,
http://www.unos.org/whatWeDo/research.asp (last visited June 12, 2010).
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making informed decisions, sets standards for patient care, and offers
educational programs for professionals.8 3
Despite the UAGA and NOTA, the severe shortage of
transplantable organs in the United States persists.84 In fact, the UAGA
and NOTA have hindered rather than helped to increase the organ
supply because prohibiting compensation leaves altruism as the only
quasi-incentive to donate-an incentive that has proven to be
ineffective. 5
C. LegislationAbroad
The scarcity of organs for transplantation is not confined to the
United States-it is a global problem. Internationally, the two main
methods of organ procurement are presumed consent and express
consent; both unfortunately have failed to procure enough organs to
meet the demand.87 In a presumed consent system, as utilized by France,
Belgium, Austria, Spain, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, and Singapore,88 it
is implicit that all citizens will donate their organs upon death unless
they dissent to donation while living. 89 France and Belgium have a soft
presumed consent system, 90 which forbids removal of organs if the
deceased's family objects and that objection is made known.9 1 In France
and Belgium doctors are encouraged to seek family consent and inform
them of their right to decline to donate. 9 2 Although seeking family

83. United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do, http://www.unos.org/whatwedo/ (last
visited June 12, 2010).
84. As of April 6, 2010, 106,773 people are waiting for a potentially life saving organ
transplant. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last
visited June 12, 2010).
85. This is evident from poor donation rates under the current system. See supra notes 10-12
and accompanying text.
86. See Chandis, supra note 20, at 217-18.
87. See Magda Slabbert & Hennie Oosthuizen, Commercialization of Human Organs for
Transplantation:A View From South Africa, 24 MED. & L. 191, 192 (2005).
88. Troy R. Jensen, Comment, Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and Their
Effectiveness, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 555, 564-65 (2000).
89. Slabbert & Oosthuizen, supra note 87, at 193. Most countries which employ a presumed
consent system of organ procurement have a national database listing all individuals who have
chosen not to be organ donors. Id.
90. Statz, supranote 43, at 1693.
91. See Emily Denham Morris, Note, The Organ Trail: Express Versus Presumed Consent as
Paths to Blaze in Solving a CriticalShortage, 90 KY. L.J. 1125, 1136 (2002).
92. Statz, supra note 43, at 1692-93.
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consent is not required, in France and Belgium many doctors continue to
act in accordance with the wishes of the deceased's family.9 3
Austria has a strict presumed consent system under which a
deceased's organs may be harvested, regardless of the wishes of the next
of kin, 94 unless the deceased had chosen not to be an organ donor and
that request is presented in writing.95 Doctors in Austria have no legal
obligation to seek consent from the deceased's family or search for
documents of the deceased's wishes. If there is doubt as to the
deceased's intentions, the organs may still be harvested. 97 As a result, in
most emergency situations, if the deceased's organs are viable, they will
be harvested since the deceased often will not have a written document
stating his desire not to donate when he arrives at the hospital.98
Austria has seen an increase in its organ supply since the
implementation of its presumed consent legislation. 99 The average
number of donors per million per year rose from 4.6 before the 1982
legislations, which established the presumed consent system, to an
average 27.2 donors per million per year between 1986 and 1990.100 To
deter its citizens from opting out, if an individual registers his dissent to
donate and is later in need of an organ transplant that individual is
placed at the bottom of the transplant wait list.10' This penalty is likely
the leading cause of Austria's steep donation rate increase.102
Singapore offers more tangible incentives to deter its citizens from
opting out. In Singapore, those registered as organ donors have priority
on the wait list and the "immediate family members of an organ donor
receive a 50% subsidy in medical expenses for the five years following
the donation." 0 3 Such legislation would likely face First Amendment

93. Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives
for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 224 (2001). In France, doctors seek family
consent more than 90% of the time. Id.
94. Id. at 225; Abena Richards, Comment, Don't Take Your Organs to Heaven ...Heaven
Knows We Need Them Here: Another Look at the RequiredResponse System, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
365, 389 (2006).
95. Richards, supra note 94, at 389.
96. Id; Statz, supranote 43, at 1694.
97. Statz, supra note 43, at 1694.
98. Richards, supranote 94, at 389. This system of procurement is also called conscription, or
"routine salvaging." Id. at 379. Conscription is the strongest form of presumed consent since
consent before donation is not required from anyone, including the donor. Id.
99. Statz, supranote 43, at 1694-95.
100. Id.
101. See id at 1694.
102. Cf id. at 1695 (noting that car accidents may be the true reason for the steep donation rate
increase experienced in Austria).
103. Id. at 1696.
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constitutional challenges in the United States as many religions
proscribe cadaveric organ donations. 104
Brazil did not experience a similar growth in donation rates under a
presumed consent system. In 1996, only 2.7% of people in need of an
organ transplant received one. 05 Therefore, in order to increase their
organ supply, Brazil passed the Presumed Organ Donor Law
establishing a presumed consent system of organ procurement.'06 Due to
widespread public disapproval and a resulting decline in organ
donations, Brazil reverted back to an express consent system of organ
donation'o7 similar to the model the United States and South Africa
currently employ. Under an express consent system an individual must
voluntarily choose to be an organ donor and take affirmative steps to
demonstrate that intent, such as stating so in a will or signing a donor
card. 08 In Brazil, unless his desire to donate is made known, upon death
his organs may not be harvested for transplantation. 09
Despite limited success in Austria, both the presumed consent and
express consent models of organ procurement have failed to bridge the
gap between the supply and demand for transplantable organs.110 An
alternative to these models is imperative to save thousands of lives in the
United States and around the world. An organ procurement system that
offers financial incentives for living and cadaveric organ donation has
the potential to cure the organ shortage by appealing to those individuals
who would not otherwise consider donation.
IV. REBUTTAL OF COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
LEGALIZATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONATION

This section rebuts the most commonly raised arguments against
legalizing financial incentives for both living and cadaveric organ
donation. While there are legitimate counterarguments against
104. Richards, supra note 94, at 393.
105. Jensen, supra note 88, at 558. The low transplant rate may be attributed to cultural and
geographic factors. In Brazil, rural towns lack modem healthcare facilities capable of conducting
organ transplants. Further, because of the distance between towns and the rugged terrain only 10%
of organs arriving at the hospital are transplantable. Another reason for the low transplant rate in
Brazil is that many believe that harvesting organs would desecrate the human body. Id. at 558-59.
106. Everton Bailey, Comment, Should the State Have Rights to Your Organs? Dissecting
Brazil's Mandatory Organ Donation Law, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 707, 708 (1999).
"Unless manifestation of will to the contrary . .. it is presumed that authorization is given for the
donation of tissues, organs and human body parts, for the purpose of transplantation or treatment of
diseases." Id. (citations omitted).
107. Morris, supra note 91, at 1138.
108. See Keller, supra note 16, at 860.
109. Slabbert & Oosthuizen, supra note 87, at 193.
110. Id.
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authorizing the sale of organs, strict regulation and oversight will
assuage many of these concerns.
A. The Poor Will Not Be CoercedInto Selling Their Organs
The picture that opponents of financial incentives paint in the mind
of society is one of an impoverished mother selling her kidney to a
multi-millionaire in order to feed her three young children."' Opponents
of a market in organs believe that financial incentives compromise the
voluntary nature of the decision to donate and can therefore be coercive,
particularly to poor and minority communities.112
This argument contains several weaknesses. First, it is paternalistic
and blatantly insults the poor, as it implies that the poor are not
competent people capable of making rational decisions that best serve
their interests. The prohibition against financial incentives for organ
donation is inconsistent with other potentially dangerous activities
engaged in daily by those looking for an economic advantage."' The
government, without societal objection, permits the poor to engage in all
sorts of risky activities, such as working on construction sites and in
mines in order to subsist. 1 14 Just as society deems all competent
individuals capable of assigning a reasonable risk-to-pay association
before entering a profession, society should permit these same
individuals autonomy to assign value to the risks attending organ
donation. 15
In a capitalist society with an unequal distribution of resources,
it is inevitable that the inducement of compensation will affect
some peoples more than others, and that people of lesser means
will be more likely to donate at any given payment level than
people of greater means. The well-to-do rarely accept
dangerous, dirty, or unpleasant jobs, whereas the near-destitute
often do.' 16
The use of a financial incentive to induce one to engage in a risky
activity is not inherently coercive, nor is payment for such activities

111. Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 93-94.
112. Id; Korobkin, supra note 4, at 51; Slabbert & Oosthuizen, supra note 87, at 197-98;
Chandis, supra note 20, at 229.
113. See Shaun D. Pattinson, Organ Trading, Tourism, and Trafficking Within Europe, 27
MED. & L. 191, 199 (2008); see also Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Paymentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1813, 1842-43 (2007).
114. See Volokh, supra note 113, at 1842-43; see also Pattinson,supra note 113, at 199.
115. See Pattinson, supra note 113, at 199; see also Volokh, supra note 113, at 184243.
116. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 54.
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impermissible." 7 As long as informed consent is obtained, organ
donations in exchange for financial incentives, like all other transactions
in today's market economy, are completely voluntary."l8
Anticipation of an economic gain often provides motivation for
individuals to act.' 19 These payments, in all other circumstances, are
viewed as a reward or an exchange for time and effort, not coercion.12 0
Coerce means "to force or compel, as by threats, to do something" and
"to bring about by using force. . . ."1 2 1 If financial compensation were
permitted, the purchasing agency would not threaten or pressure the
perspective donor. The agency would simply offer potential donors
compensation in exchange for a voluntary donation; there would be no
coercion.' 22 The free market system for female eggs for use in assisted
reproduction illustrates that economic coercion of the poor should not be
a concern impeding the legalization of financial incentives for organ
donation. Ova are freely sold, yet the majority of egg donors are not poor
or minority women. 123 This suggests that if organs were to be sold in the
same method as eggs, no economic coercion would result.
Moreover, the selling price of an organ will not be high enough that
the poor will be compelled to donate by the possibility of becoming rich
overnight.12 4 Mechanisms of supply and demand will determine the price
of organs.12 5 Offering financial incentives will increase the number of
available organs resulting in a decrease of organ prices. 126 It is therefore
unlikely that the price would be the sole factor in one's decision to
donate; altruism would still play a substantial role.12 7 For those who are
still distrustful and feel the need to protect the poor, in order to eliminate
the fear of coercively high prices, the government can set a maximum
price on organs so the poor will not have the opportunity to bargain for
high consideration.
Additionally, for those who believe banning organ sales is
necessary to protect vulnerable groups, let's consider a policy that
117. See id. at 51, 53. For instance, coal mining is a dangerous career, yet we would not require
one who works as a miner to do so without compensation. Id. at 54.
118. See id. at 51.
119. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 5, at 832.
120. Id.
121. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 283 (4th ed. 2002).
122. Beard & Kaserman, supranote 5, at 832.
123. Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500for a
Kidney? An Argument to Establisha Marketfor Organ ProcurementSimilar to the Current Market
for Human Egg Procurement,82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1245-46 (2004).
124. Yau, supranote 46, at 106.
125. Id. at 105.
126. Id. at 105-06.
127. See Beard & Kaserman, supranote 5, at 834.
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allows only adults over a certain income level to receive financial
compensation for living or cadaveric organ donations. The poor would
still be encouraged to donate, however would not be compensated for
their donation. 12 8 Faced with such a proposal, it seems evident that any
person in the excluded income bracket would rather have the option to
donate for compensation. Society, under the faqade of protecting the
poor, is actually denying the poor "the use of one of the few assets they
have, their bodies and, by extension, their personal autonomy."l 29
B.

The Rich Will Not Monopolize Available Organs

A fear in permitting the sale of organs is that the poor will be
persuaded to sell their organs which only the rich could afford to
purchase, creating a disproportionate allocation of organs among
socioeconomic groups.130 The main weakness of this argument is that it
assumes the recipient is the party paying for the organs.' 3 1 If this were
the case, the rich would monopolize all available organs by outbidding
the poor.13 2 Such a system would also lead to chaos, bribery, and
absurdly high prices for organs. 133 A foretaste of this occurred in 1999
when a Florida resident attempted to auction his functioning kidney on
eBay.134 By the time eBay discovered and removed this offer, the
bidding had reached over $5.7 million.135 However, if procurement
agencies were to purchase organs from donors and then allocate the
organs to recipients in the same manner allocated today, no such bidding
wars would occur and the poor would have equal access to organs.
It is a reality that wealth influences all sorts of daily health care
decisions. About 46.3 million Americans, or 15.4% of the population, do
not have health insurance.' 36 If the government and society truly cared to
prevent wealth from influencing health care, the lack of coverage of
128. Id. at 832-33.
129. Boyd, supra note 16, at 466.
130. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 5, at 831; Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 93-94; Slabbert &
Oosthuizen, supra note 87, at 197; Chandis, supra note 20, at 229-30.
131. See Beard & Kaserman, supra note 5, at 831.
132. Lobas, supra note 33, at 503.
133. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Auction for a Kidney Pops Up on Ebay's Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 1999, at Al3.
134.

Id.

135. Id. The advertisement read: "Fully functional kidney for sale. You can choose either
kidney. Buyer pays all transplant and medical costs. Of course only one for sale, as I need the other
one to live. Serious bids only." Erica D. Roberts, Note, When the Storehouse is Empty,
Unconscionable Contracts Abound: Why Transplant Tourism Should Not be Ignored, 52 How. L.J.
747, 748 n.1 (2009).
136.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE

UNITED STATES: 2008 20, 22 (2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
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these 46 million Americans would have been remedied through
universal health care coverage.' 37 Transplants are expensive and thus are
generally only available to those with health insurance, government
provided healthcare, or personal funds.138 Personal finance therefore
should not be a concern prompting the ban on organ sales because, due
to insufficient health care coverage, the poor currently have unequal
access to organ transplants.139
Without a transplant, health care funders would be paying for other
treatment necessitated by the underlying illness, such as dialysis.14 0 Long
term care in the absence of a transplantable organ is typically more
expensive then the transplant itself.14 1 For example, medical expenses
associated with a kidney transplant, including after-care, are on average
$100,000 less than expenses stemming from long term dialysis.14 2 It is
thus more financially efficient for health care providers to pay up to
$100,000 for a kidney than to pay for long term dialysis, no matter the
wealth of the patient.14 3
C. The Human Body is Already Commodified
Most Western nations believe that permitting the sale of human
body parts is morally and ethically wrong, as it devalues the human body
and undermines the sanctity of life.'" Some who strongly oppose
offering financial incentives describe the practice as "trafficking in
human flesh," 4 5 "strip[ping] the human body of its proper dignity," 4 6
and violating "the dignity of man." 47 This argument focuses on the fact
that the product being sold is a part of a human being,14 8 however in the
Unites States, ova banks thrive by buying and selling eggs to women for

137. Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 100.
138. Volokh, supra note 113, at 1839.
139. Charles C. Dunham IV, "Body Property": Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ
Transplantation to Protect Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 63 (2008).
140. Volokh, supra note 113, at 1839.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Lisa Milot, The Case Against Tax Incentives for Organ Transfers, 45 WILLAMETTE L.
REv. 67, 86 (2008); Sunny Woan, Comment, Buy Me a Pound ofFlesh: China's Sale ofDeath Row
Organs on the Black Market and What Americans Can Learn From It, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
413, 436-37 (2007).
145. Crespi, supra note 22, at 21.
146. Ann Bindu Thomas, Note, Avoiding EMBRYOS "R" US: Toward a Regulated Fertility
Industry, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247, 258 (2008).
147. Woan, supra note 144, at 437.
148. Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 97-98.
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use in assisted reproduction.14 9 Infertile women have paid thousands of
dollars for these eggs and the chance to conceive and deliver a child.so
Just as society embraces a market for ova, the bodily product that creates
life, society should express similar sentiments for a market in organs, the
bodily product that sustains life.' 5 '
Additionally, this contention is irreconcilable with the realities of
today's market economy, in which almost every aspect of the human
body is commodified in one way or another.152 Models are paid for their
beauty, singers for their voice, athletes for their superior strength and
dexterity, and professionals for their knowledge. Additionally, some
biological vaccines derived from cells lines of the human body are
patented no differently than any other product in today's market.'15 It is
fundamentally inconsistent to hold that commodification of life saving
organs is so pervasively immoral as to be prohibited, but not these other
multi-million dollar industries which are nearly unanimously accepted

by society.' 54
Moreover, bartering in organs, also called paired organ exchanges,
occurs in the United States under the guise of altruism, however the
essence of the transaction is no different than donating an organ in
exchange for financial compensation. 1 Consider a hypothetical
situation demonstrating a paired organ exchange:'5 6 Two waitlist
patients, Patient A and Patient B, have friends and family who are
willing to donate to their respective patient. However, Patient A's
willing donors are incompatible with Patient A, but compatible with
Patient B. Conversely, Patient B's willing donors are biologically

149. Id. at97.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 98. Opponents of financial incentives for organ donors argue that since a woman has
more eggs than she will ever need they are considered regenerative, like sperm and blood, and
therefore do not carry the same concerns as organ donation. See Andrew Wancata, No Value for a
Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-Inalienabilityof the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 22324 (2003). Due to technological advances this argument no longer has merit as the line between
regenerative and non-regenerative body parts has blurred. Today, surgeons can perform split liver
transplants which involve a live donor donating part of his liver. Id. The half livers within time
regenerate into complete, fully functioning livers. Id. Additionally, despite ethical issues, with
further research physicians may be able to grow new organs from stem cells. Id. Therefore ova
should not be distinguished from organs on the basis that ova are regenerative and organs are not.
Id.
152. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulationof Oocyte Donation, 2001
BYU L. REv. 107,135.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 135-36.
155. See Woan, supra note 144, at 440.
156. Michael T. Morley, Note, Increasing the Supply of Organsfor Transplantation Through
PairedOrgan Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 221, 224 (2003).
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incompatible with Patient B, but are compatible with Patient A. A paired
organ exchange occurs when the willing donor of Patient A donates his
organ to patient B on the condition that the willing donor of Patient B
donates his organ to Patient A. 157
There is a legal objection that you're not allowed to trade or sell
organs for "valuable considerations," but the folks who run the
kidney establishment. . . ha[ve] managed to delude or persuade
themselves that these swaps are, in fact, pure altruism .

. .

.I

don't care about the linguistics at this point-I think it's
baloney.. . . It's a market for barter.
Commodification of the human body occurs whether the exchange
is organ-for-organ or organ-for-money. It is therefore puzzling why
donating an organ in exchange for financial compensation is forbidden
when, at the same time, donating an organ in exchange for an organ is
not only permitted but encouraged.15 9 The form of the transactions may
be different, but in substance they are indistinguishable.
D.

Organ DonationDoes Not Impose UnconscionableHealth
Risks on Live Donors

Those opposed to live organ donations fear that financial incentives
would induce all people, not just the poor, to gamble with their health
and lives.160 Organ donation, however, is not nearly as dangerous as the
general public may think. The mortality rate after a kidney donation is
only about 0.03%,161 which can be further reduced through careful
selection of donors and enhanced prophylactic measures.162
Additionally, there is less than a 2% risk of complication and no
increased risk of kidney disease.16 3 To exemplify the low risk associated
with live organ donations, fishers and related fishing workers have a

157. Id. (calling for an expansion of the existing national organ waitlist to "include information
about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient, and using [that] data to
identify cross-matches").
158. Interview by Russ Roberts with Richard Epstein, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chicago
(June 5, 2006), available at http://www.econtalk.org/ archives/2006/06/the economics o_4.html
(the quote can be found approximately six minutes into the interview).
159. Woan, supranote 144, at 440.
160. See Volokh, supranote 113, at 1841.
161. Id.; Watkins, supra note 22, at 30; Morley, supra note 156, at 232.
162. Watkins, supra note 22, at 30.
163. Volokh, supranote 113, at 1841; Morley, supra note 156, at 232.
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0.1% risk of death while on the job, structural iron and steel workers
have a 0.04% risk of death and roofers have a 0.03% risk.164
E. FinancialIncentives Would Not Lead
to PrematureTermination of Care
There is the apprehension that financial incentives for cadaveric
donations would lead to premature termination of care for critically
injured or terminally ill patients.16 5 This argument is flawed for several
reasons. First, the financial incentives offered would not be sufficiently
lucrative to persuade family members to prematurely "pull the plug" on
their loved ones. 166 Second, it is the family of the deceased who would
receive the financial benefits for donation, not the physician.16 7
Physicians would have nothing to gain by prematurely terminating
care; rather they have everything to lose, for example, their medical
license, by such practices.169 Third, many hospitals have protocols
prohibiting the discussion of organ donation with the family until the
decision to withdraw life support has been made.o7 0 Thus, family
members do not know whether their loved ones organs are of donatable
quality until the decision to terminate life support has been made.
F. Altruism Would Still Play a ProminentRole
in the Decision to Donate
The United States relies on altruism and volunteerism to procure
organs for transplantation.171 Those opposed to financial incentives for
donation fear that permitting the sale of organs would eliminate altruistic
tendencies among American citizens.17 2 These opponents fail to realize
that paid and unpaid organ donations can coexist without reducing
altruism.' 73 Compensation does not necessarily obliterate the altruistic
164.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL CONSENSUS

OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL

INJURIES IN 2008 4 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf, accord Volokh, supra
note 113, at 1842; Watkins, supra note 22, at 30.
165. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 5, at 833; Chandis, supra note 20, at 236.
166. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 5, at 833-34.
167. Id. at 833.
168. Id.
169. Keller, supra note 16, at 873 (noting that if a surgeon were to remove a patient's organs
before that patient was pronounced dead, the surgeon would be charged with homicide).
170. Carlson, supranote 69, at 161.
171. Kimberly J. Cogdell, Saving the Leftovers: Models for Banking Cord Blood Stem Cells,
25 ISSUES L. & MED. 145, 160 (2009).

172. Dunham, supra note 139, at 64; Slabbert & Oosthuizen, supra note 87, at 198; Boyd,
supranote 16, at 464.
173. Boyd, supra note 16, at 464-65.
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nature of an act. For example, enlistees are compensated for their time in
the army, yet all would agree that army service is nevertheless still
altruistic.17 4 Compensation for organ donation is not intended to
reimburse the donor for the market value of their organ plus profit;
rather it is solely meant to act as a motivator to encourage citizens to
consider donation, to complete a donor card or join a donor registry.
Organ donation, regardless of compensation, is a selfless act motivated
by the desire to help others; altruistic ideals will still play a prominent
role in the decision to donate.
V.

EGG DONATION

The ability to extract human ova, fertilize it in a Petri dish and then
place the resulting embryo into another women's uterus has given many
infertile women the chance to conceive and deliver a child.'75 By 1983,
in vitro fertilization ("IVF") using a donor egg became a successful
option for many infertile women.17 6 Not long thereafter, by the early
1990s, a market for egg donors was widespread.'" Each year thousands
of women sell their eggs on the open gamete market.17 8 These women
are generally recruited by assisted reproductive technology clinics
through advertisements on college campuses 7 9 and the internet. 8
Donor candidates are evaluated based on intellectual, genetic, and

174. See Christian M. Williams, Note, Combatting the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and
Inadequate Organ Supply Through PresumedDonative Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315,
362 (1994).
175. Most commonly, donor eggs are needed due to premature ovarian failure, poor egg
quality, or diminished ovarian reserves most frequently caused by maternal age. Sanford M.
Benardo & Katherine Benardo, Assisted Reproductive Technology: Egg Donation and Surrogacy
Arrangements in Law and Practice, 2 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 406,407 (2007).
176. Id IVF is the assisted reproductive process in which eggs are extracted from a donor,
fertilized exteriorly and then implanted into the uterus of the recipient. See THE N.Y. TASK FORCE
ON

LIFE AND

THE LAW,

THINKING OF BECOMING AN

EGG DONOR?

6,

14-19 (2009),

http://www.health.state.ny.us/publications/ 127.pdf (discussing the process of egg donations and its
attending risks).
177. Benardo & Benardo, supra note 175, at 407. In 2000, approximately five thousand egg
transfers took place, though not all resulted in a successful pregnancy. Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free
Trade in Human Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated
Internet, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 263, 266 (2006).
178. Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in
Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 167, 167 (2008).
179. Id at 167; Sarah B. Angel, Recent Development, The Value of the Human Egg: An
Analysis of Risk and Reward in Stem Cell Research, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 183, 198
(2007).
180. Terman, supranote 178, at 167.
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physical traits18 ' and are generally chosen by purchasers based on these

attributes.182
Currently in the United States women are typically paid between
$5,000 and $8,000 per ovulation cycle. 8 3 There have, however, been
instances in which women with certain desirable traits, physical
characteristics or academic achievements have been paid as high as
$50,000 to $100,000 for their eggs.18 4 Some evidence suggests that the
egg donors are persuaded to donate by the lure of financial
compensation.1
A. Egg DonationLegislation
Legislation in the United States is virtually silent on gamete donor
compensation.1 86 While NOTA is the closest federal legislation to
prohibiting the market in ova, it does not apply to gametes.187 Currently,
Louisiana is the only state that explicitly prohibits the sale of ova' 88 and
Virginia is the only state that explicitly authorizes the sale.189 The
silence of the other states can be interpreted as an implied acceptance of
the practice.190
181. Id.; Angel, supra note 179, at 198.
182. Terman, supra note 178, at 167. Some agencies allow potential purchasers to meet and
interview potential donors. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 49.
183. Chung, supra note 177, at 279.
184. Korobkin, supranote 4, at 49; Chung, supra note 177, at 279.
185. Chung, supra note 177, at 285-86.
186. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of
Compensationfor Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1057 (2006).
Even the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, which requires fertility clinics to
publish their pregnancy success rates and certify laboratories handling embryos, does not grant any
agency authority over clinical practices, such as regulating compensation. Thomas, supra note 146,
at 252.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006) (defining the term "human organ" to mean "the human
(including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or
any subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from
a fetus)").
188. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) ("The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited."). This law is based on the principle that an
"embryo has the same legal status as a person." Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MiNN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 505, 536-37 (2005).
189. VA. CODE. ANN. §32.1-291.16 (2008). The statute states that:
With the exception of hair, ova, blood, and other self-replicating body fluids, it shall be
unlawful for any person to sell, to offer to sell, to buy, to offer to buy, or to procure
through purchase any natural body part for any reason including, but not limited to,
medical and scientific uses such as transplantation, implantation, infusion, or injection.
Id.
190. While no other state has laws dealing specifically with the sale of gametes, states do have
laws dealing with other issues surrounding artificial reproductive technology and IVF. Virginia, for
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Several countries regulate financial compensation for egg
donations. For instance, the United Kingdom and Canada prohibit
compensation in excess of the donor's reasonable expenses.'' Likewise,
although Belgium has no specific assisted reproductive technology
regulations, since the Belgium Civil Code, Article 1128, states that body
parts may not be sold, most fertility clinics only allow reimbursement
for reasonable expenses incurred.192 In these countries, women in need
of an egg donation rely on purely altruistic egg donors and as a result
often have to wait years before a donor is found.' 93
B. Arguments in Favor of a Free Market in Ova
1. Without Financial Incentives the Supply Would Not Meet the
Demand Leaving Many Infertile Women Unable to Procreate
As with organ donations, altruism alone does not generate adequate
egg donations.19 4 Without financial incentives for ova donations the
supply will fail to meet the demand, leaving many infertile women
unable to procreate. In countries such as Israel, England, Germany, and
France, where compensation for gamete donations are prohibited, there
is a shortage of eggs for use in assisted reproduction.' 95 Because of the
rarity of the altruistic donor, women frequently must wait as long as five
years to receive a donation and typically do not have a choice in the
features of the donor.19 6 Although it is possible that other variables such
as religious beliefs, social norms, and health care systems contribute to
the discrepancy in ova donations between the Unites States and countries
that do not permit compensation, it is evident that in the United States
compensation does have a positive effect on supply.'91 Before one
couple listed a $50,000 advertisement seeking an egg donor with certain
characteristics, they received few responses, none which matched the

example, requires HIV tests for gamete donors, New Hampshire has laws regarding how long
embryos can be stored in vitro, and Pennsylvania requires that certain IVF statistics be reported.
Moses, supra note 188, at 537-38.
191. Chung, supra note 177, at 271-72. See also Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,
2008, c. 22, §47 (U.K.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 2, §§ 5-6 (Can.).
192. Chung, supranote 177, at 272.
193. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
194. Baum, supra note 152, at 158; John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the
Assisted Reproduction Industry, 85 TEx. L. REV. 665, 688 (2007).
195. Baum, supra note 152, at 158-59; Robertson, supra note 194 at 687-88.
196. Baum, supra note 152, at 158-59. This is unlike women in America, who have the
privilege of choosing a donor based on physical or intellectual characteristics. Terman, supra note
178, at 167.
197. Baum, supra note 152, at 159.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 10

780

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:757

profile they desired.198 However, after increasing the listed
compensation to $50,000 they were swamped with hundreds of
replies.' 9 9 As it is clear that supply does not meet the demand when
donor compensation is prohibited-until a compelling justification to
deny infertile women access to donor eggs is identified-a free market
for ova should prevail.
2. Procreative Liberty
Procreative liberty is the right to decide whether or not to
procreate. 200 It includes the right to reproduce and the right to avoid
reproducing. 20 1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution protects certain fundamental rights, such as the
right to be free from governmental interference in matters relating to
procreation,202 intimacy,203 and marriage.204 There is currently no U.S.
Supreme Court case recognizing the right to non-coital reproduction as a
fundamental right, however precedent indicates that such a right would
be found to exist.2 05
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing and education.... These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 6
Additionally, procreative liberty requires access to all reasonable
means of executing the choice to, or not to, procreate.2 07 The reason for
this is because "the decision whether or not to procreate is so
198. Id. at 159 n.133.
199. Id.
200. John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439,
447 (2003).
201. Id
202. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (freedom to terminate a pregnancy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (freedom of unmarried individuals to use
contraceptive); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (freedom to use
contraception in a marital relationship).
203. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (freedom to engage in adult consensual
sodomy).
204. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (freedom to marry a person of another
race).
205. See Moses, supra note 188, at 519-20; John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood:
Legal andEthical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1989).
206. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
207. Baum, supranote 152, at 113.
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fundamental, so personal, that its denial would be antithetical to the
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness."2 08 This sentiment is supported in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,20 9 the Supreme Court case that established the
right to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man,"2 1 0 a right that
is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."2 "
Skinner is the only Supreme Court case to recognize the right to
procreate; all other precedent regarding reproduction involves the right
to avoid procreation. 2 12 In Griswold v. Connecticut2 13 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird214 the Court confirmed a woman's right to avoid reproduction
through the use of contraception and in Roe v. Wade215 and Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey2 16 through abortion.2 17 Although no Supreme Court
case deals explicitly with the right to be free from restrictions to
procreate through the use of assisted reproduction, the above noted
precedent protecting privacy in coital reproduction indicates that such a
right would be confirmed. 21 8 Therefore, if the right to non-coital
reproduction were found to be fundamental, regulations imposing an
undue burden 219 on access to donor eggs, in the absence of an overriding
state interest, would be unconstitutional.22 0
3. Sex Equality
Laws restricting a woman's right to procreate have an
overwhelming "sex-specific impact" because, although both men and
women procreate, only women become pregnant and only women
undergo IVF.2 21 Society is overly concerned about the ethical
208. Id.
209. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a state statute authorizing sterilization of
habitual criminals).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 51 (2008).
213. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
214. 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
215. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
216. 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
217. This is not an absolute right. Casey only recognizes the right to an abortion up until
viability. Id. at 870.
218. MAURA A. RYAN, ETHICs AND EcoNOMics OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE COST OF
LONGING 94 (2001).

219. In the context of abortion, an undue burden exists if the "purpose or effect [of a
government regulation] is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a women seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability." Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
220. See Daar, supranote 212, at 52-53; Moses, supra note 188, at 520.
221. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 980-81
(1984) (noting that the best argument for the plaintiffs in Roe v. Wade would have been one based
on the principles of sex equality, not due process or privacy).
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implications of compensating egg donors, but shows no
acknowledgment or unease towards compensating sperm donations. To
proscribe compensation for egg donations but not sperm donations is
manifestly discriminatory, especially considering women undergo a
greater burden while donating.222
Women, like men ... should now be free to get out of their
protected sphere and enter the market on an equal basis. Men in
power should not tell them what to sell and what not to sell.
Whatever is problematic . .. should be for women to deal with
as a matter of their own moral deliberation and choice. 223
Any law excluding only women from the market subordinates women,
denies their equality and facilitates the maintenance of existing gender
based inequalities.2 24
VI.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATING ORGAN DONATIONS

There is widespread public support for providing financial
incentives for organ donation in the United States. A study done by the
UNOS showed that 52% of Americans support compensating organ
donations, 5% have reservations, and only 2% consider financial
incentives "immoral or unethical."225 In addition to the pervasive
support, the following considerations illustrate why offering financial
incentives is an effective way to increase the organ supply.
A. The Policy Concerns Underlying the Organ Sale Ban are
Immaterial Consideringthe Widespread Supportfor Egg Donations
The policy concerns underlying the ban of financial incentives for
organ donations prove to be immaterial when compared to the sale of
ova. A major apprehension among those opposed to organ sales is that
the poor will be coerced into selling their organs by the prospect of
economic gain.226 The sale of ova has the potential to be far more
coercive than the sale of organs because a woman can sell her eggs

222. John A. Robertson & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues in Egg Donation, in FAMILY
BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 144, 151
(1996); Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation:
Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 257, 277 (2002).
223. Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 350-51
(1991).
224. Baum, supra note 152, at 161-62; Angel, supra note 179, at 215-16.
225. Watkins, supra note 22, at 24.
226. See supranotes 111-29 and accompanying text.
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many times in her lifetime, as opposed to a kidney which, of course, can
only be donated once. Moreover, ova have been sold for as high as
$50,000-thousands of dollars more than would ever be offered for an
organ under a regulated, incentive-based, system of organ donation.22 7
Additionally, manipulative tactics are often used by assisted
reproductive agencies in an effort to solicit donors. 2 2 8 Hoping to
capitalize on students in need of money, these agencies mainly advertise
in college newspapers and, more recently, on popular social networking
websites.229 Despite these tactics, the free market system for eggs
illustrates that economic coercion is a nonissue. Eggs may be freely sold
yet the majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women. 23 0 This
suggests that a financial compensation system for organs, comparable to
eggs, would not be coercive.
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, it is inconsistent to believe the sale of
some body parts is immoral but not others. If it does not belittle human
life to pay for eggs, a bodily product which is the source of life, then it
does not belittle human life to pay for a bodily product which prolongs

life. 231
B. The Donor is the Only Party Not Compensated
for His Role in the Transplant
The prohibition of financial incentives "does not include the
reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation,
processing, preservation,
quality control,
and
storage .. . or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred
by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ." 2 32 Therefore, although the organs themselves are not for sale, all
other products and services in connection to the organ procurement and
transplant are.233 Society does not require suppliers of any other goods or
services to act solely out of selfless motives. However, this provision

227. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 49.
228. See, e.g., Angel, supranote 179, at 198.
229. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
230. Robertson & Crockin, supra note 222, at 151; Sobota, supranote 123, at 1245.
231. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006).
233. Cate, supra note 61, at 85; Yau, supra note 46, at 98-99; see also Peter S. Young, Moving
to Compensate Families in Human-Organ Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B7 (describing
organ transplants as "quite lucrative.... It's like a car at a chop shop. Somebody's making a
handsome fee off of processing the parts."); infra notes 235-37 (multiorgan donors generate
considerable revenue for OPOs and hospitals because each recipient is charged separately).
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allows all parties except the source of the organ to receive compensation
for their services.234
Under the current system of organ procurement, Organ
Procurement Organizations ("OPO"s) are paid to recover organs from
donors.235 Hospitals, after finding a match, purchase the organs from the
OPOs. 2 3 6 The patients then pay the hospital for the cost of procuring the
organ, the procedure and all other fees associated with the procedure and
hospital stay.2 37 Money is exchanged at every level except that of the
source, the level without which the transplant would not occur.
It has been contended that the patient is paying for the operation,
rather than for the actual organ.238 However, the transplant cannot occur
without the organ. This contention is analogous to the claim that in
paying for a meal at a restaurant, the patron only pays for the dining
service and not the food itself. 239 The medical treatment and the organ
"are sold together as an indivisible package,"240 it would require extreme
naYvet6 for anyone to believe otherwise.
C. Compensating Organ Donations Would Increasethe Organ Supply
and Consequently Reduce the Priceof Organ Transplants
The organ shortage is a textbook example of how a zero-price
policy on a commodity eliminates the supplier's incentive to sell, or in
this case donate, their product, thereby creating a relentless demand for
the commodity. 241 "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest." 2 42 For instance, if lawyers were prohibited to charge
for their legal services, there would be a dramatic decrease in the
number of practicing attorneys. It should therefore be of no surprise that
more people are not willing to donate their organs without some form of
external motivation. Permitting financial incentives for organ donations
will substantially increase the number of willing donors, alleviating the
nation's organ shortage. 243 As the demand for transplantable organs
234. Boyd, supra note 16, at 463.
235. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163, 180 (2000); Boyd,
supra note 16, at 462.
236. Boyd, supranote 16, at 462.
237. Id.
238. Mahoney, supranote 235, at 182; Boyd, supra note 16, at 463.
239. Mahoney, supranote 235, at 182; Boyd, supra note 16, at 463.
240. Boyd, supranote 16, at 463.
241. Crespi, supranote 22, at 19.
242.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

18 (General Books LLC 2010) (1776).
243. Yau, supra note 46, at 105-06.
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subsides, the price of those organs will decline as well, significantly
reducing the total price of an organ transplant. 2 44
In addition to reduced costs of transplants, with an increase in the
number of transplants performed, money will be saved on long term
treatment of the underlying illness. One study showed that based on the
cost of dialysis for each person on the kidney wait list "society could
break even while paying $90,000/kidney vendor." 2 45 Other studies had a
break-even point of $35,000 per organ, a price which still far exceeds
any proposed financial incentive.24 6 Thus, any donor compensation
under $35,000 per organ would result in an economic gain.
D.

ConstitutionalRight to Medical Self-Defense

Professor Eugene Volokh 2 4 7 maintains that the organ sale ban
imposes an undue burden on an individual's ability to protect himself
using medical care, a right which Professor Volokh has termed "medical
self defense." 248
Where most other constitutional rights are concerned, bans on
using money (either from a bank account or an insurance policy)
to help exercise a right are obviously substantial burdens on the
right...
. Likewise, courts have repeatedly struck down
restrictions on the spending of money to speak, because such
restrictions burden speakers' ability to effectively convey their
message.

...

[I]f a ban on paying for one scarce good needed to

exercise a constitutional right (teachers', lawyers', doctors', or
authors' time, or space for a political ad in a newspaper)
substantially burdens that right, then a ban on paying for another
scarce good (providers' organs) should generally do so as
well.249

244. See id.
245. Arthurs, supra note 16, at 1119 (quoting Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payingfor
Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A Cost-Effective Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 216
(2004)).
246. Id
247. Eugene Volokh is a Professor of Law at UCLA Law School, where he teaches, among
other courses, free speech law, criminal law, religious freedom law, and church-state relations law.
Professor Volokh clerked for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the U.S. Supreme Court and for
Judge Alex Kozinski on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Eugene Volokh,
http://www.law.ucla.edulvolokh/ (last visited June 12, 2010).
248. See generally Volokh, supra note 113, at 1815-18 (contending that individuals have a
constitutional right to protect themselves using healthcare).
249. Id at 1835-36 (citation omitted); cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992) (concluding that in order for a regulation to be unconstitutional, the law must impose, or
intend to impose, a "substantial obstacle" on the exercise of a fundamental right).
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The ban on compensating donors limits the number of organ donations
made each year, leaving many in need without a transplant. 2 50 According
to Volokh, "[as] long as a ban on compensating organ providers keeps
many patients from getting the organs they need to live, it constitutes a
substantial burden on the right to medical self-defense, and is therefore
presumptively unconstitutional." 251
VII.

A PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATED MARKET IN ORGANS

Above I argued why financial incentives for organ donations are the
most logical and efficient way to increase the supply of transplantable
organs and save thousands of lives each year. In order to accomplish this
in a fair and ethical manner safeguarded from abuse, the government
must establish an agency, overlooked by the OPTN, to regulate the
organ market. This agency will be the sole entity permitted to purchase
organs from donors or, in the case of cadaveric donors, their families.
The agency would offer the donor a price, determined by market forces,
which would fluctuate from time with changes in supply and demand.2 52
Once purchased, the organs will be distributed according to the
UNOS guidelines in the same manner that they are allocated today.
Those in need of an organ must be registered on UJNOS's wait list. 25 3 To
register, candidates must meet medical requirements and prove that they
have the means to finance the transplant.254 Once on the wait list, organs
will be allocated based on a standardized formula which awards points
based on a variety of factors including biological compatibility, duration
on the wait list, distance from the donor, gravity of the candidate's
medical condition, and the likelihood of long term success from the
transplant.255 Transplant centers must also consider the cause of the
candidate's organ failure and psychosocial factors such as alcoholism,
drug abuse and mental retardation.2 56
Starting with the patient with the highest score, organs will first be
offered to patients in the same Donation Service Area ("DSA") as the
donor (there are fifty-eight DSAs nationwide).25 7 If there is no

250. See Volokh, supra note 113, at 1836-37.

251. Id.
252. See Crespi,supra note 22, at 48; Chandis, supra note 20, at 233.
253. Marc S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ Donations, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS, 293, 299 (2005).

254. Id. at 299-300. See also Dunham, supra note 139, at 48-49 (contending that the current
organ distribution scheme creates inequalities in organ distribution).
255. Dunham, supra note 139, at 48; Nadel & Nadel, supra note 253, at 300.
256. Lobas, supra note 33, at 479.
257. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 253, at 300.
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compatible recipient, the organ will then be offered to patients in the
donor's OPO region (there are eleven OPOs nationwide).2 58 In the event
that no compatible candidate is found, the organ will be offered
nationwide.259
Under this proposal the only way to avoid the UNOS wait list is to
receive a donation from a compatible friend or family member, no other
direct donation will be permitted.2 60 If a stranger wishes to donate an
organ, he must do so through UNOS. 2 61 This will prevent potential
recipients from bargaining with willing donors, a practice that has the
potential to become exploitative.2 62 This does not mean that one wishing
to donate an organ must accept compensation; rather it means that they
must donate their organ through UNOS and according to UNOS's
procurement and allocation procedures.
In order to reimburse the procurement agency, the organ transplant
center will include the price the agency paid for the organ in the
recipient's operation bill.263 By having a government regulated agency
purchase the organs and distribute them according to the UNOS wait
list, this will not be a situation akin to people standing on the corner
bargaining for organs. No matter the wealth of an individual, organs will
be allocated based entirely on the point system.
A. Additional Protective Measuresfor Direct FinancialIncentives
Considering that the main argument against financial compensation
for organ donation is the risk of exploitation and coercion of the poor,
additional measures, although unnecessary, may be taken to safeguard
against these concerns. Irrespective of supply and demand, the
government can place a maximum and minimum cap on the selling price
for each organ. A maximum price cap would prevent donors or donor
families from being able to bargain with the OPO for an excessively
high selling price, as well as ensure that the selling price never becomes
so lucrative as to compel donation. The minimum price cap will likewise
safeguard donors from inequitably low selling prices.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Watkins, supra note 22, at 27-28.
Id
See id. at 28; supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
Watkins, supra note 22, at 27.
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B. IndirectFinancialIncentives
As an alternative to providing direct payments for organ donations,
other forms of payment may be offered as incentives to donate.
Although these incentives would not place cash directly into the hands
of the donor or the donor's estate, they would help ease some other
financial burdens associated with organ donation.2 64 Indirect incentives
distance the economic benefit from the decision to donate, eliminating
many of the concerns opponents have with the sale of organs. 2 65
1. Reimbursement for the Medical Care and Funeral Expenses of
Cadaveric Donors
At the very least, families of cadaveric donors should receive
reimbursement for the medical care and/or funeral expenses of the
donor. The following true story exemplifies the fundamental unfairness
of the current transplant system: The mother of Susan Sutton, a twentyeight year old female who took her own life, made the decision to donate
her daughter's organs. 26 6 Her heart and liver saved lives, her corneas
gave sight, her bones were used for reconstructive surgery, and her skin
provided grafts for burn victims. 2 67 Not only were the recipients of her
tissue and organs given a prolonged and improved quality of life, but
both the doctors and the hospitals performing the transplants, as well as
the organ procurement agency, profited from her donation. 268 Susan,
however, was buried in an unmarked grave because her mother was
unable to afford a gravestone and the law prohibited her from donating
her daughter's organs in exchange for a proper burial.269
In 1994, Pennsylvania sought to remedy this inequity by enacting a
Death Benefits Program. 2 70 The Act created the Organ Donation
Awareness Fund.2 7 1 The fund, supported by $1 donations from
Pennsylvania residents, reimbursed a cadaveric donor's estate up to
$3,000 for "reasonable hospital and other medical expenses, funeral
expenses, and incidental expenses incurred by the donor or donor's
264. See David I. Flamholz, Note, A Penny for Your Organs: Revising New York's Policy on
Offering Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 329, 355 (2006).
265. Id.
266. Young, supranote 233, at B7.
267. Cate, supranote 61, at 85; Young, supranote 233, at B7.
268. Young, supra note 233, at B7. "A singe multiorgan donor ... can generate considerable
revenue as each recipient is separately billed for each donor organ." Id. In the case of Susan Sutton,
at least $22,000 went to the OPO as its acquisition charge alone. Id. See also Calandrillo,supra note
46, at 115.
269. Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 115; Young, supra note 233, at B7.
270. Calandrillo, supra note 46, at 116.
271. Id.; Carlson,supra note 69, at 146.
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family in connection with making a vital organ donation." 2 72 In order to
ensure that the transfer of money was not made directly to the donor's
estate, payments could "only be made directly to the funeral home,
hospital or other service provider related to the donation." 2 73 This system
silenced many opponents of an incentive-based system of organ
procurement as it prevents individuals and corporations from
capitalizing on the sale of organs and preserves the altruistic nature of
organ donation.2 74
Unfortunately, in 2002, the Pennsylvania Department of Health
held that these benefits came too close to violating NOTA's prohibition
against offering valuable consideration for the purchase or sale of
organs, and reduced donor reimbursement to $300.275 The remainder of
the fund now goes toward organ donation awareness programs.27 6
Despite critique that $300 creates little incentive to donate, during
the first six months of the revised Death Benefits Plan, nineteen donor
families applied for the $300 donation benefit. 2 77 Further, the number of
Pennsylvanians carrying an identification card designating them as an
organ donor increased by 0.5%, making an additional 83,344
Pennsylvania citizens potential cadaveric organ donors.2 78 Thus indirect
financial incentives, at least in Pennsylvania, have proven to be a
successful method of increasing the potential donor pool.
2. Tax Benefits
Tax benefits for organ donors, living or cadaveric, is another
reasonable alternative to direct compensation. 279 Many states, Wisconsin
being the first, have adopted legislation granting tax deductions to living
organ donors. 280 Wisconsin allows for a maximum deduction of $10,000
from adjusted gross income for costs incurred from donating all or part

272. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8621-22 (West 1995).
273. Id. §8622.
274. See Carlson,supra note 69, at 149.
275. Id. at 146.
276. Calandrillo, supranote 46, at 116.
277. Flamholz, supra note 264, at 358. Eighteen donor applicants were living donors and one
was a cadaveric donor. Boyd, supranote 16, at 460.
278. Flamholz, supra note 264, at 358. This includes a donor card or a driver's license
indicating wiliness to be an organ donor. Id.
279. See Molen, supra note 11, at 461-63 (arguing that federal tax law should be changed to
allow living donors to deduct expenses associate with their donation that are not covered by
insurance).
280. Id. at 481. Other states which provide similar tax deductions include Arkansas, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Utah. Id.
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of a liver, kidney, pancreas, intestine, lung, or bone marrow. 2 8 ' This
deduction may be claimed for all donation related expenses that are not
covered by insurance, such as travel, lodging, and lost wages.28 2
Currently, this incentive is only available to living donors.283 Under my
proposal, tax benefits can easily be made available to cadaveric donors
by offering a tax credit to the donor's estate.2 84
Other indirect financial incentives to donate can include a life
insurance policy for live donations, a gift to the donor's charity of
choice,285 or college tuition credits for the survivors of cadaveric
donors.2 86 Compensation does not need to be proportional to the
estimated monetary value of the donated organ in order to afford
adequate incentive to donate. Those already inclined to donate may be
encouraged to complete a donor card when given a slight external
motivator.28 7
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The current organ procurement system in the United States relies
solely on altruistic volunteers. As admirable as this system sounds, it has
failed to produce enough volunteers to meet our organ transplant needs.
The demand for transplantable organs drastically exceeds the supply
such that on average eighteen people die each day waiting for an
organ.28 8 This situation is likely to persist unless law makers open their
minds to the possibility of providing some financial incentive to donate.
Despite established laws, financial incentives for organ donations
are a plausible solution to the nation's organ shortage. Opponents can
cite endless objections to the use of financial incentives for both living
and cadaveric donations, most which have proven to be unconvincing,
yet they fail to suggest a better alternative. Because of paternalistic fears
of abuse and exploitation, it is unlikely that financial incentives will gain
full acceptance by society. Nevertheless, through strict government
regulations and oversight, these fears can be minimized.

281. Jo Napolitano, Wisconsin Senate Approves Tax Deduction for Organ Donors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A12.
282. Molen,supranote 11, at481.
283. Chandis, supra note 20, at 266.
284. Id. at 266-67. A tax credit for the deceased's estate may not be much of an incentive for
the poor, however may increase the number of donations by the rich. Id. at 267.
285. Arthurs, supranote 16, at 1122.
286. John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ TransplantProgram: When Push Comes to
Shove, II J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197, 214 (1994).
287. Cate, supranote 61, at 85-86.
288. See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
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Throughout the world, no organ procurement system has seen
success.289 It is time to try a new system. It is time to accept the
possibility that offering financial incentives has the potential to cure the
nation's organ shortage. By continuing to prevent the implementation of
an incentive-based system of organ procurement, those opposed to
incentives are effectively condemning thousands of people to death each
year, and even more to a life of suffering. How quickly will those
opposed to financial incentives change their position the moment they
are in need of a life saving organ?
SaraKriegerKahan*

289. Watkins, supra note 22, at 2.
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